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Abstract 
We report results from a weak-link – often also called minimum-effort – game experiment with 
multiple Pareto-ranked strict pure-strategy Nash equilibria, using a real-effort rather than a chosen-
effort task: subjects have to sort and count coins and their payoff depends on the worst performance 
in the group. While in the initial rounds our subjects typically coordinate on inefficient outcomes, 
almost 80 percent of the groups are able to overcome coordination failure in the later rounds. Our 
results are in stark contrast to results typically reported in the literature. 
JEL classification: C72, C92. 
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1.  Introduction  
Coordinating  the  activities  of employees  is a  key  problem  of  all  organizations  (March and 
Simon, 1958; Schelling, 1960; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Malone and Crowston, 1990; Malone 
and  Crowston,  1991).  An  important  experimental  literature  seems  to  have  demonstrated 
convincingly that, even when incentive problems are not present, employees often fail to match the 
actions  of  “co-workers”,  causing  “organizations”  to  drift  into,  or  stay  locked  in,  inefficient   2
equilibria for a wide range of coordination games (see, for reviews, Camerer, 2003 and Devetag and 
Ortmann, 2007b). Arguably the most prominent workhorse in this literature has been the weak-link, 
or minimum-effort, game which features multiple Pareto-ranked pure-strategy Nash equilibria and 
the toughest task interdependence possible: the minimum effort supplied by a member of a group of 
employees determines the outcome of the organization and, consequently, everybody’s payoff.
1  
Van Huyck et al. (1990) were the first to demonstrate the speedy downward drift  to the minimum 
effort for this game (a process commonly called “coordination failure”, even if subjects manage to 
coordinate  on  the  worst  equilibrium),  a  result  which  –  ceteris  paribus  –  has  been  replicated 
consistently.
2  
As also suggested by Weber (2006), the evidence on coordination failure in the lab seems, 
however, partly inconsistent with what we observe outside the lab. Relatedly, Devetag and Ortmann 
(2007b) have shown that there are a number of ways, which typically seem to increase external 
validity, to engineer coordination successes in the lab. However, all weak-link game experiments 
conducted so far rely on the critical assumption that the choice of a nominal effort level from a 
given range, or a “chosen effort”, is a reliable proxy for real effort. This assumption is problematic 
since  in  actual  organizations  work  “involves  effort,  fatigue,  boredom,  excitement  and  other 
affections not present in the abstract experiments” (van Dijk et al., 2001: 189).  
The concern about this assumption stems from important recent questions about the external 
validity of laboratory data (e.g., List, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007). Indeed, experiments in other 
classes of games have demonstrated that the choice of real effort can make a significant difference 
(Gneezy and List, 2006; Hennig-Schmidt et. al., 2005; García-Gallego et. al., 2008). To the best of 
our knowledge, no evidence exists yet about how real effort affects coordination in the weak-link 
                                                
1 The take-off of airplanes is the prototypical example of a coordination problem of the weak-link type (e.g., Knez and 
Simester, 2001); the airplane cannot depart before all operations (e.g., fueling, security checks, loading of luggage, 
boarding of passengers, etc.) have been completed. On-time departure depends upon the slowest operation: a unilateral 
increase in the level of effort is likely to be in vain if it is not matched by an increase in effort of complementary 
activities. For example, speeding up the boarding of passengers does not make sense if it is not matched by speedy 
loading of luggage. Other examples of interest are the writing of a grant proposal involving several participants or an 
edited volume involving several authors.  
2 Engelmann and Normann (2007) is the only exception that we are aware of.    3
game or, for that matter, any other coordination game often studied in the lab. Thus, in this paper 
we  explore  whether  coordination  failure  in  weak-link  game  experiments  survives  real-effort 
implementations. 
We designed an experiment where effort had to be exerted in performing the following task: our 
subjects (employees, hereafter) had to sort and count coins worth 1, 2, 5, and 10 Euro cents within a 
given time interval. Through pilot experiments, we calibrated the time interval so that employees 
had to exert some effort to accomplish the task; moreover, since the time allotted was likely to be, at 
least initially, not sufficient for some of the participants, employees were offered the opportunity to 
buy extra time to complete the task (i.e., employees of our laboratory firm could decide to spend 
extra  time  at  their  workplace  to  complete  their  task).
3  In  Group  treatments,  employees  were 
randomly assigned to groups of four (firms, hereafter) and were paid according to a weak-link 
earnings table: specifically, their earnings were a function of the worst counting performance of a 
firm member. In Individual control treatments, strategic interaction and strategic uncertainty were 
stripped away by having employees “work” alone and paying them according to their individual 
performance. Motivated by results of previous chosen-effort weak-link game experiments, we also 
explored the impact of temporarily increased incentives, different cost parameters, and different 
information treatments. 
Our results are in sharp contrast to the speedy downward drift to the minimum effort commonly 
observed in previous experiments. Indeed, after initially failing, almost 80 percent of our laboratory 
firms succeeded in coordinating on the efficient equilibrium. A substantial part of the firms that 
coordinated on the inefficient outcome in the initial rounds were able to overcome coordination 
failure well before incentives were modified through increased bonuses, rendering this treatment of 
lesser importance than in other contexts (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2006b).  
Our  results  contribute  in  at  least  three  ways  to  the  existing  literature.  First,  we  provide  a 
laboratory testbed that allows the study of coordination games with real effort rather than chosen 
                                                
3 In real life the cost of staying longer at work is the opportunity cost of leisure, which is difficult to implement in the 
lab, especially in a repeated game. Therefore, extra time is bought here for money.   4
effort tasks. Second, we show that in our testbed a history of coordination failure in performing a 
real task can be overcome in a large majority of cases. We thus show that chosen effort might not be 
a reliable measure of real effort. Our findings fundamentally question the results reported in the 
large literature on coordination games and raise new questions. Third, we provide evidence on how 
and  why  coordination  failure  might  be  overcome  in  a  real-effort  setting  and  hence  lay  out  a 
promising research agenda. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce our real-effort weak-link game and 
in Section 3 we describe experimental design and implementation. In Section 4 we briefly review 
the literature. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The real-effort weak-link game  
2.1. The chosen-effort weak-link game 
Purely theoretical considerations fall short of predicting which of the Pareto-ranked equilibria 
employees  will  select  in  a  coordination  game  since  none  of  the  known  selection  criteria  has 
empirically  strong  support.  Van  Huyck  et  al.  (1990),  for  example,  demonstrated  the  speedy 
downward drift to the worst equilibrium for a weak-link game with multiple Pareto-ranked strict 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Their result attracted considerable attention for its apparent support 
of selection principles such as security or risk dominance over efficiency.  
The closely related laboratory set-up of Brandts and Cooper (2006b) is our point of departure. In 
their study, each group of employees represents a firm whose productivity is determined by the 
minimum  effort  provided  by  one  of  the  firm’s  employees.  The  employees  perform  the  task 
repeatedly  with  fixed  matching.  In  each  round,  all  employees  decide  their  individual  levels  of 
effort.
4 The employees are guaranteed a fixed wage, F, and a bonus rate, B, which is announced by 
the experimenter at the beginning of each round. Employees independently select an effort level 
                                                
4 In chosen-effort experiments performance is solely determined by effort choice, as innate ability and experience 
clearly do not apply, contrary to our real-effort task.    5
{ } 40 , 30 , 20 , 10 , 0 ∈ i e  and incur a cost i Ce , which increases linearly in the level of effort chosen. The 
per-round payoff to employee i is given by the following function: 
    (1) 
where   is the minimum effort provided by one of the firm’s employees.   
        [Table 1 about here] 
The parameters are set in such a way that coordinating on any effort level is a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium that is strict. If everyone picks the highest possible action (“effort”), then the Pareto-
dominant (“efficient”) equilibrium is selected (see Table 1). Choosing the highest effort is risky, 
however, since one may end up with zero if the minimum effort in the firm turns out to be zero. A 
similar  argument  applies  in  a  repeated  game,  although  for  fixed  personnel  constellations  the 
analysis  gets  complicated  because  across-round  reasoning  might  be  applied  by  employees. 
Consider, for example, an employee that is paid according to Table 1 and has experienced a history 
of coordination failure in previous periods (minimum effort = 0).
5 The employee has an incentive to 
provide a higher effort only if he/she expects all co-workers to raise their effort with a fairly high 
probability.
6  Clearly,  if  the  cost  of  effort,  C,  is  decreased,  or  the  bonus  rate,  B,  is  increased, 
attempting to overcome coordination failure by raising one’s own effort becomes less risky ceteris 
paribus. 
 
2.2. The real-effort task 
Our  real-effort  task  required  employees  to  sort  and  count,  within  a  given  time  interval,  a 
variable number of coins worth 1, 2, 5, and 10 Euro cents.
7 The task was, quite intentionally, highly 
                                                
5 The payoff matrix in Table 1 is extremely unforgiving and, since the purpose of the studies was to study how an initial 
history of coordination failure can be overcome, was designed to be so in order to induce coordination failure. Indeed,  
speedy unraveling towards inefficient outcomes was observed in all previous experiments which employed the same or 
similar tables (Brandts and Cooper, 2006b; Cooper, 2006; Hamman et al., 2007). 
6 For picking the higher effort level of 10 in order not to have a negative expected value, the player should expect that 
the probability that all others raise the effort is at least 5/6 (for more details see Brandts and Cooper, 2006b).  
7 The total number of coins contained in each bag varied from 32 to 35. Coins worth 1 and 2 cents were present in 
amounts that varied from 8 to 14, coins worth 5 cents varied from 6 to 10, and coins worth 10 cents varied from 2 to 4. 
The composition of each bag was made in such a way that overall difficulty and total number of coins were roughly the   6
repetitive and unexciting, so as to minimize the possibility that our employees would derive any 
positive utility from performing the task. Although highly stylized, our task shares many features 
with a variety of blue and white collar jobs. For instance, assembly line workers are required to 
perform  highly  repetitive tasks under tight time constraints and low quality in  one step  of the 
production process may result in low quality outcomes. Our real-lab task also captures the main 
features of data entry and payroll clerks types of task. Since the time for completion was short, the 
task  required both physical and cognitive effort. Indeed, drawing on a series of pilot experiments, 
we calibrated our experiment so that the regular time employees were endowed with would, at least 
initially, not be sufficient for some participants, which would induce coordination failure. However, 
employees were given the opportunity to buy extra time to complete the task whenever needed; 
notably, the additional time, if asked for, gave less skilled employees a chance to complete the task 
correctly. This opportunity, however, came at a cost. Think of this set-up as capturing the essence of 
organizational  scenarios  in  which  workers  are  willing  to  voluntarily  spend  extra  time  at  their 
workplace,  or  at  home,  to  complete  their  work.
8  The  introduction  of  extra  time  is  a  crucial 
ingredient of our design and serves two main purposes: first, it makes coordination possible but not 
trivial even in the case of highly heterogeneous skills and poorly performing employees; second, it 
is risky since it entails a net loss, as compared to the safe strategy of doing nothing, if coordination 
fails. 
 
2.3. The real-effort weak-link game 
Following the advice of Davis and Holt (1993: 520) to not change too many things at once, we 
draw on the payoff function used in Brandts and Cooper (2006b), but depart by necessity from (1) 
in three important aspects. First, since the costs of effort are not known to us we do not explicitly 
include them in the payoff function. Second, the minimum effort in the firm is defined as the 
                                                                                                                                                            
same for all subjects and rounds. Pilot experiments confirmed that there was no difference in the time needed for sorting 
and counting coins included in different bags. The sequence of bags was the same in all sessions. 
8 Of course, in real life overtime represents the opportunity cost of reduced leisure, while in this experiment extra time 
entails an explicit cost.   7
highest number of errors in the counting task (worst performance, henceforth), truncated at four. 
We define the number of errors as the sum of the differences between the correct and reported 
number  of  coins  for  each  coin  type.  Finally,  the  cost  of  buying  extra  time  is  included  in  the 
function. In each round, up to four slots of extra time could be bought. Thus, the per-round payoff 
received by any of the employees in our experiment is represented by the following payoff function: 
    (2) 
Where    is  the  worst  performance  (i.e.,  the  highest  number  of 
counting errors in the firm), C is the cost of one slot of extra time, and  i t  is the number of slots 
bought by employee i.  
        [Table 2 about here] 
Table  2  presents  the  earnings  tables  for  different  parameterizations  of  B  and  C.  A  proper 
analysis of the equilibria in the game is not possible since, contrary to chosen-effort experiments, 
there  is  no  one-to-one  correspondence  between  effort  and  performance;  indeed,  “subjective 
payoffs”  include  the  cost  –  possibly  heterogeneous  –  of  effort  and  necessarily  differ  from  the 
nominal payoffs reported in the earnings table. Given the impossibility of knowing employees’ 
subjective cost of effort in our setting, Tables 1 and 2 are not directly comparable.  
That said, our earnings table shares many features with the one used by Brandts and Cooper 
(2006b). First, the bonus is computed on the basis of the worst outcome in the firm. Second, in each 
round employees have the possibility of getting a sure fixed wage of 200 by exerting zero effort as 
in Brandts and Cooper (2006b). (We explicitly stated in the instructions that employees would 
receive their fixed wage in each round even if they chose to do nothing.) Third, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the subjective cost of effort increases as the number of errors decreases. Moreover, in 
case one or more slots of extra time are needed to lower counting errors, employees also face an 
explicit  cost  and  achieving  higher  coordination  levels  is,  indeed,  risky.  That  is,  if  the  worst 
performance is equal to four errors, by buying extra time employees incur a net – and explicit – loss 
with respect to the fixed wage. At the same time, payoffs are such that, even buying four slots of   8
extra time may be worth the explicit cost if worst performance is equal to zero errors. (Compare that 
scenario to one where no extra time is bought but four or more errors are committed).
9 Finally, to 
overcome a history of failure might be difficult and risky. For instance, an employee that is willing 
to reduce his errors from 4 to 3, but needs to buy a slot of extra time to do so, incurs a cost of 50 
while gaining at most 10.
10  
 
3. Experimental design  
3.1. Design 
The design of our experiment is meant to test whether real effort affects coordination in the 
weak-link game for selected parameterizations of the payoff function and different informational 
feedback modes. Moreover, in order to better understand our results, we compare conditions in 
which employees are paid according to either worst (Group condition) or individual performance 
(Individual condition). 
Sixteen  rounds  divided  in  three  Parts  were  played  in  each  session.  Informed  by  our  pilot 
experiments and what is typically observed in auctions, we expected a task-learning effect for the 
initial rounds. Part 1, therefore, lasted eight rounds rather than the four rounds each that constituted 
Parts 2 and 3. We expected a decrease in the number of errors in the initial rounds and a marginal 
role of task learning in the subsequent rounds.  
Previous evidence on the weak-link game suggests low deviation (from equilibrium) costs and 
the  higher  relative  attractiveness  of  the  payoff-dominant  equilibria  to  be  efficiency-enhancing 
(Devetag and Ortmann, 2007b for a review; see also Devetag and Ortmann, 2007a), while the 
evidence on the effects of full feedback is mixed (Van Huyck et. al., 1990; Devetag, 2005; Brandts 
and Cooper, 2006a).  Hence, we tested  whether these  results also hold  for real-effort tasks and  
varied our treatments accordingly along three dimensions. First, we changed the bonus rate B to test 
                                                
9 Clearly, it pays to buy extra time to bring errors (and worst performance) down only if the perceived cost of effort is 
not too high. In this case, and for this parameterization, the perceived cost of effort has to be no higher than 40. 
10 This example makes reference to B=60 and C=50 as reported in the first panel of Table 2.   9
how the relative attractiveness of the payoff-dominant outcome affects coordination. In Variable 
treatments,  the  bonus  rate  B  was temporarily  increased  in  Part  2,  while  in  Fixed  treatments  it 
remained constant (see Table 3). Our sequencing of the bonus was designed to reproduce in the lab 
plausible real-world scenarios,
11 following Brandts and Cooper (2006b) and Hamman et al. (2007).  
[Table 3 about here] 
Second, in order to investigate how deviation costs affect coordination, the cost of buying each slot 
of extra time was varied by having high and low deviation-cost treatments.
12 Finally, two modes of 
informational  feedback  were  implemented:  in  Partial  Feedback  treatments  employees  were 
informed only about the worst performance in the firm, while in Full Feedback treatments they 
were informed about the number of errors made (errors being truncated at four) and the extra time 
bought by each employee of their firm.  
In Group treatments, four employees were randomly and anonymously selected to constitute a 
firm and this assignment did not change throughout the experiment (and was common knowledge). 
For  the  Group  conditions we implemented only the  variable  bonus  scheme  in a within-subject 
treatment, whereas the between-subject treatment was composed of a 2 [Full vs. Partial Feedback] x 
2 [High vs. Low deviation costs] design (see Table 4). 
In Group conditions, performance (measured as number of errors) is the result of effort and 
ability, which may go in the same or the opposite direction. While ability tends to increase with task 
repetition and hence, ceteris paribus, causes the number of errors to decline over time (what we call 
task learning), the level of effort exerted may be a function of strategic considerations, and may 
increase or decrease over time as a function of others’ behavior in the game and of expectations 
about  the  outcomes of future games (to which we refer as strategic  learning  below).  It seems 
plausible to assume that the presence of uncertainty about others’ effort and performance (“strategic 
                                                
11 The case of Continental Airlines, presented in Knez and Simester (2001) as a prototypical example of weak-link in 
the field, presents a similar evolution of incentives over time (see Knez and Simester, 2001 for detailed case 
discussion).  
12 In our experiment, contrary to previous chosen-effort experiments, the deviation costs neither refers to the cost of 
effort nor to the deviation from the equilibria since both effort and equilibria cannot be explicitly determined. In the 
remainder of the paper we use “deviation costs” to make reference to the cost of buying extra time.     10
uncertainty”) tends to decrease effort with respect to a situation in which an employee is only 
rewarded  according  to  his/her  own  performance.  Hence,  in  order  to  disentangle  the  relative 
contribution of strategic learning and task learning, we ran baseline treatments without strategic 
uncertainty, for which the assumption that effort of employees is constant over time was therefore 
easier to rationalize.  
In the Individual conditions, the same stage game was repeated by having employees working 
alone (i.e., group size equal to 1), with their per-round payoff still depending upon the number of 
errors made and extra time bought. The payoff tables were the same as the ones used in the Group 
treatments, only the label “Worst performance in the group (number of errors)” was substituted with 
“My performance (number of errors)”. In the Individual treatments, we implemented a 2 [High vs. 
Low deviation costs] x 2 [Variable vs. Fixed bonus] design.
13 Table 4 summarizes the experimental 
design for both Individual and Group conditions, with the number of employees (subjects) reported 
for each treatment.  
        [Table 4 about here] 
To sum up, our experimental design is meant to address several research questions. First of all, 
we want to explore the effect of real effort in the weak-link game as compared to the chosen effort 
used in previous lab experiments. In particular, we use our testbed to investigate whether the initial 
failure to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, and the subsequent unraveling typically observed 
in similar weak-link experiments towards the worst of the equilibria, survives our real-effort setting, 
Specifically, we would like to answer these questions:  
Question I: Is failure to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium observed in the initial 
round(s) in our real-effort setting? 
Question II: Is speedy unraveling towards the inefficient equilibrium observed in later 
rounds, or is it possible to overcome coordination failure by introducing real effort in 
the lab? How and why exactly does coordination evolve over time? 
                                                
13 Note that in the Individual condition, the distinction between Full and Partial feedback treatment does not make 
sense.   11
Moreover, we investigate how strategic uncertainty and task learning interact, by comparing Group 
and  Individual  conditions,  and  how  this  interaction  may  affect  the  ability  for  employees  to 
coordinate: 
Question III: Does strategic uncertainty undermine the learning process in the counting 
task?  
Finally, we explore the effect of different parameterizations and informational modes: 
Question IV: Does an increased bonus enhance coordination? 
Question V: Do modes of information feedback and size of deviation costs affect errors 
and coordination? 
The Results section is organized around these five questions. 
 
3.2. Implementation 
A total of 144 subjects participated in the experiment, which was conducted at the Computable 
and Experimental Economics Lab (CEEL) at the University of Trento. A total of 16 sessions were 
conducted. All subjects were students from the University of Trento and were recruited through ads 
and posters.  
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to a cubicle and no form of communication was 
allowed from that moment on. A paper copy of the instructions (see Appendix) and of the relevant 
earnings table was distributed at the beginning of each Part and instructions were read aloud to 
assure common knowledge. Following Brandts and Cooper (2006b), we used a corporate context 
instead of neutral terminology. After reading the instructions, a questionnaire was distributed to 
ensure correct understanding; in case of incorrect answers, the instructions were read again. Before 
the experiment proper started, in order to familiarize subjects with the task, they were given a small 
bag containing coins, similar to the one that would be used in the experiment, and were asked to 
report the result of their counting task on a paper. Before each round started, and before they 
received a small bag containing coins worth 1, 2, 5, and 10 cents, subjects were asked to wear   12
headphones. The total number of coins contained in the bag varied from round to round and from 
firm to firm, while the types of coins were the same throughout the experiment.  
        [Figure 1 about here] 
In each round, subjects had 45 seconds of regular time to perform the task; a sound informed 
them of the beginning of the round and a clock visualized the passing of time on each participant’s 
monitor. In each round, subjects had the option of buying at most four slots of extra time, lasting 12 
seconds each, simply by clicking a button (see Figure 1). The result of the counting activity had to 
be reported in four cells in the bottom part of the screen before time expired; a sound always alerted 
subjects when the time (regular or extra) was about to expire. The number of errors made by each 
participant was computed as the sum of the errors in each cell; in case one or more cells were left 
blank  or  the  numbers  were  not  confirmed  by  clicking  the  “OK”  button,  the  number  of  errors 
translated automatically into the worst possible outcome of 4 or more.  
The  sessions  averaged  1  hour  and  30  minutes.  All  values  were  expressed  in  Experimental 
Currency Units (ECUs) and were converted at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1 Euro for  
333 ECUs. Subjects knew the conversion rate in advance and were paid their earnings plus a fixed 
show-up fee of two Euros (see instructions in the Appendix) privately. The average total earnings 
for the Group condition were 16.81 Euros. For the Individual condition the average total earnings 
were 20.98 Euros. Before we present and discuss our results, we briefly review related literature. A 
more detailed discussion may be found in Devetag and Ortmann (2007b). 
 
4. Related literature 
In their path-breaking work, Van Huyck et al. (1990) have documented that initial failure to 
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium and subsequent unraveling to Pareto-dominated equilibria  
seems to occur almost invariably in large groups of 14 to 16 subjects. The speedy unraveling toward 
Pareto-dominated equilibria (and in fact the lowest ranked of the Pareto-ranked equilibria) has been 
– ceteris paribus – reproduced without fail (Knez and Camerer, 1994; Berninghaus and Ehrhart,   13
1998; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Chaudhuri et al. 2005; Blume and Ortmann, 2007) and in several 
of these cases with lower numbers of subjects.  
Various  ways  to  improve  coordination,  relative  to  these  baseline  cases,  have  been  recently 
identified  in  the  lab.  For  instance,  several  researchers  have  demonstrated  that  the  lower  the 
attractiveness of – and the deviation costs from – the secure strategy, the more likely the payoff-
dominant  equilibrium  will  be  reached.  Goeree  and  Holt  (1999)  have  provided  evidence  that 
reducing  the  cost  of  deviation  from  equilibrium  in  one-shot  games  with  two  or  three  players 
improves coordination. Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) have obtained similar results by increasing 
the number of rounds. Van Huyck et al. (2007) have enhanced coordination by using a finer grid of 
actions. Furthermore, a change in the attractiveness of the risky actions has been investigated by 
manipulating the bonus rate. Brandts and Cooper (2006b) have shown that an increase in financial 
incentives – namely, an increase in the bonus from coordination on higher-payoff equilibria – is 
effective in overcoming the coordination failure that is almost invariably reached in initial rounds, 
even with relatively small groups (four subjects). They also find that subsequent reductions in the 
bonus have only marginal effects on coordination and small incentives are as effective as large 
ones. Hamman et al. (2007), on the contrary, have found that substantive incentives are far more 
effective  than  nominal ones,  and  once  incentives  are  removed  a  speedy  unraveling  toward  the 
inefficient outcome occurs.
 14 
Moreover, there is evidence that communication, competition, pattern of growth, and subject-
pool composition affect coordination. Costless pre-play communication has been shown to reduce 
coordination failure in case of both minimal informational content (Blume and Ortmann, 2007) and 
open-ended messages (Cooper, 2006; Brandts and Cooper, 2007; Chaudhuri et al. 2005). Bornstein 
et al. (2002) have observed more efficient coordination by introducing inter-group competition. 
Weber (2006) has shown that large groups of 12 players can coordinate successfully if the groups 
                                                
14 The difference in these results might be due to the different financial incentives used; in Brandts and Cooper (2006b) 
incentives applied to all equilibria, while in Hamman et al. (2007) players obtained the bonus only if they reached a 
given threshold.    14
start out small and new players are gradually added in subsequent periods. Information about a 
group’s history is crucial for efficient coordination to be achieved. However, Knez and Camerer 
(1994) have found that merging two groups of three players significantly lowers the minimum effort 
even when information about group history is publicly available. Engelmann and Normann (2007) 
have shown that the subject-pool composition seems to affect coordination in the weak-link game
15. 
Informational feedback and precedent transfer, however, do not have an unambiguous effect on 
coordination. Van Huyck et al. (1990) and Devetag (2005) have found a negative or no effect of full 
feedback (i.e., information about the full distribution of efforts in previous periods) on coordination, 
while  Berninghaus  and Ehrhart  (2001) and Brandts and  Cooper (2006a) have found a  positive 
effect. Devetag (2005) has found that precedent transfer from a similar game enhances coordination 
in the minimum game, while no evidence of transfer has been found by Knez and Camerer (2000).   
 
5. Results 
It might be useful to recall at this point some terminology and idiosyncrasies of our experiment. 
We cannot directly observe the cost of effort exerted by our experimental subjects; thus, we use the 
number of errors as an approximation for effort, the assumption being that, controlling for task 
learning, lower numbers of errors correspond to higher effort. The term errors refers to the number 
of mistakes made at the employee-level, while worst performance indicates the highest number of 
errors made at the firm level by any of the employees (a variable corresponding to the minimum 
effort in chosen effort experiments). Notice that in our experiment efficient coordination is achieved 
when all employees make the smallest number of errors possible (i.e., worst performance equals 
zero), while in previous studies successful coordination was achieved when all employees chose the 
highest action value.  
                                                
15 The experiment was run in Denmark and two-thirds of the participants were Danes; the minimum effort increased as 
the share of Danish subjects in the group increased.    15
We are mainly interested in coordination failure/success in a repeated game setting: for this 
reason, and since in the first round learning and precedent effects do not apply, we analyze behavior 
in the first (and initial) rounds separately from behavior in later rounds.  
Repeated observations at the employee level are not independent, and, furthermore, employee-
level  data  also  show  correlation  for  employees  of  the  same  firm.  Therefore,  when  testing  our 
hypotheses (and if not otherwise specified), our independent unit of observation is the mean value 
of the variable for a single firm. All tests are two-sided. 
 
5.1. Initial coordination  
Is failure to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium observed in the initial round(s) in our real-
effort setting? At the firm level, coordination failure was pervasive in the first round: 18 firms out 
of 24  coordinated on the worst outcome (i.e., worst performance = 4), although an average of 1.8 
slots of extra time per firm were bought. Of the remaining 6 firms, 5 achieved a worst performance 
of 1 or 0 in the first round; however, this good performance was the result of  several slots of extra 
time bought (2.25 on average per firm). Initial behavior, and possibly beliefs, seem not affected by 
treatments: a Mann-Whitney ranked-sum test finds no statistically significant differences at any 
conventional level between treatments in round 1 for both worst performance and extra time. A 
clear tendency toward coordination failure at the firm level is also shown in subsequent rounds. 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of worst performances over the first four periods, by pooling all 
Group treatments. In each of the first four rounds, modal worst performance was equal to 4 errors, 
while average worst performance over rounds 1 to 4 was equal to 2.7 and it was greater or equal to 
3 in 14 out of 24 firms.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
At  the  employee  level,  the  data  are  more  varied  than  at  the  firm  level.  Performances  are 
heterogeneously distributed in the first four periods in both Group and Individual conditions. Table 
5a and 5b report the distributions of errors and extra time, in round 1 and in rounds 1 through 4   16
respectively,  divided  by  “types”  of  performers.  In  the  first  round,  the  distribution  of  errors  is  
concentrated  on  the  extremes  of  zero  and  four  errors.  Although  for  about  40  percent  of  the 
employees, in both the Group and Individual treatments, the number of errors was zero in the first 
round, the task was calibrated so that high performance was feasible but not trivial. In fact, more 
than 34 percent of the employees who made zero errors (and more than 66 percent in the Individual 
conditions) could do so only by buying extra time – a quite risky strategy, considering that it entails 
a certain loss if not matched by a sufficiently higher performance at the firm level. The Individual 
condition, as compared to the Group condition, does not affect errors in the first round (p = 0.821, 
two-tailed  Mann-Whitney  ranked-sum  test);  however,  it  does  have  a  significant  effect  on  the 
number of slots of extra time bought (p = 0.043);
16 hence, to the extent that employees are more 
likely to buy extra time in the Individual than in the Group conditions, behavior in the first round is 
affected  by  strategic  uncertainty.  We  note  that  more  extra  time  does  not  translate  into  an 
improvement in average performance.  
In subsequent rounds, the frequency of employees that perform very poorly tends to decrease. 
However, in rounds 1 through 4, only 31 percent of the employees in the Group conditions managed 
to make, on average, between 1 and 0 errors without buying extra time. Table 5b also reveals that a 
non-negligible fraction of the participants (almost 17 percent for both the Group and Individual 
conditions) performed poorly over the first four periods by making, on average, more than 2 errors. 
A Mann-Whitney ranked-sum test reveals a statistically significant difference between Individual 
and Group for both average errors (p = 0.097) and extra time (p = 0.006) in the first four rounds; 
specifically,  errors  are  fewer  and  extra  time  is  higher  in  the  Individual  relative  to  the  Group 
conditions. This suggests that the lower efficiency in Group conditions stems primarily from the 
externalities imposed on Group members through weakest performance rather than from differences 
in behavior.  
                                                
16 In the first round, the single employee has been considered as the independent unit of observation since there was no 
previous interaction among members of the same firm. We pooled all Group treatments (and all Individual treatments) 
since we did not find any statistical difference in the number of errors in the first round.    17
        [Table 5 a and b about here] 
More generally, our  data suggest a positive answer  to our first research  question: coordination 
failure is observed in the initial round(s) when real effort is implemented. This is, to some extent, a 
necessary condition for our real-effort experiment to be of interest, since it demonstrates that the 
task was not too easy and, hence, coordination was not trivial to achieve. 
Result I: We observe both a high dispersion of individual performances and a high frequency of 
coordination failure over the first four periods of our real-effort experiment.  
 
5.2. Dynamic Analysis: Group Conditions 
Is  speedy  unraveling  toward  the  inefficient  equilibrium  observed  in  later  rounds,  or  is  it 
possible to overcome coordination failure by introducing real effort in the lab? How and why 
exactly does coordination evolve over time? We now turn to a dynamic analysis of firm-level data 
to answer our second set of research questions, and test whether coordination failure is overcome in 
our real-effort experiment. Table 6, which summarizes errors, worst performance, and extra time 
pooled across groups and divided by treatment, provides evidence for a positive answer to the first 
question. Worst performance in rounds 5 through 8 was lower than in the first four rounds for all 
conditions (1.85 as compared to 2.70, all treatments pooled). The average worst performance in 
Parts 2 (rounds 9-12) and 3 (rounds 13-16) was less than 2.1 for all treatments (see bottom panel in 
Table 6). Importantly, the steady decline of errors and worst performance started well before the 
bonus  rate  was  increased.  That  is,  initial  inefficiency  is  overcome  without  any  change  in  the 
structure of the incentives in 16 out of 24 firms.  
        [Table 6 about here] 
Even though the majority of the firms manage to overcome initial coordination failure and to 
reach the efficient outcome, coordination is not easy. In fact, 5 firms (unsuccessful firms, hereafter) 
never reached the payoff-dominant outcome in any of the 16 periods.
17 A Mann-Whitney ranked-
                                                
17 Furthermore, 4 out of 5 unsuccessful firms performed very poorly with an average worst performance of 3 or more in 
Part 2 or 3, or in both.    18
sum test reveals that the distribution of firms’ average worst performance differs for successful and 
unsuccessful firms (p = 0.001, two-sided).
18 Figure 3 shows worst performance over time both for 
successful  and  unsuccessful  firms.  A  non-negligible  number  of  firms  that  were  not  able  to 
coordinate  successfully  provides  important  evidence  that  task-learning  is  not  strong  enough  to 
render successful coordination trivial for all firms. Indeed, task-learning was heterogeneous across 
both employees and firms, and such heterogeneity presumably created diversity of beliefs across 
firms, and heterogeneity in the level of effort exerted.  
        [Figure 3 about here] 
Result IIa: After an initial history of failure, the majority of the firms (19 out of 24) successfully 
coordinate on the most efficient outcome, and many of them (more than 84 percent) do so before 
any change in the structure of payoffs is introduced through increased bonuses. 
In our real-effort experiment, the majority of the firms overcome initial coordination failure, 
whereas no similar dynamics have been commonly observed in previous experiments with chosen 
effort.  Towards  a  possible  explanation  of  how  and  why  coordination  failure  is  overcome,  we 
consider two factors: first, differences between successful and unsuccessful firms in initial rounds; 
second, individual adjustment dynamics. 
        [Table 7 about here] 
Table  7  reports  average  worst  performance,  errors,  and  extra  time  in  rounds  1  through  4, 
conditional on firms being successful or unsuccessful. Relative to successful firms, unsuccessful 
firms performed poorly in initial rounds. However, if only best performers (i.e., the employee with 
the  smallest  number  of errors  within  a  firm  in  a  round)  are  considered, there  is  no  difference 
between successful and unsuccessful firms in rounds 1 through 4. Hence, unsuccessful firms are 
more heterogeneous, in that the observed gap between best and worst performers is significantly 
higher (albeit weakly so) from that observed in successful firms (p = 0.085, Mann-Whitney ranked-
sum test, two-tailed).  
                                                
18 Successful firms achieved a worst performance of zero in at least one round, while unsuccessful firms did not.   19
To gain some insight into the individual adjustment dynamics, we apply a simple adaptation 
rule derived from Learning Direction Theory (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 
1998). According to this qualitative theory, players adjust their behavior, on the basis of ex-post 
reasoning, in the direction of the action that would have been a best reply to others’ behavior in the 
previous round. We apply the following rules adapted to our game from Berninghaus and Ehrhart 
(1998): 
-  Rule 1: when an employee “is the minimum” in a period, i.e. when his number of errors is 
the highest in the firm, he does not increase his errors in the next period; 
-  Rule 2: when an employee “is the non-minimum” in a period, i.e., when her number of 
errors is lower than the worst performance, she does not decrease her errors in the next 
period.
 19 
Previous research on chosen effort weak-link games has shown that non-minimum employees (i.e., 
employees who overshot relative to the firm minimum) tend to retreat to lower action choices after 
a few rounds out of equilibrium, while minimum employees often do not increase their action 
choices. This robust mechanism draws both individual effort and minimum effort down toward the 
worst  outcome and, subsequently undermines  the  possibility of escaping  from the coordination 
failure  trap.  Our  data  reveals  an  interesting  behavioral  regularity  in  the  opposite  direction:  in 
successful firms, non-minimum employees held steady for several periods eventually drawing firms 
out of initial inefficiency.  
        [Table 8 about here] 
Indeed, as shown in Table 8, Rule 1 captures well the behavior of minimum employees, as it 
explains more than 80 percent of the observed choices, while Rule 2 falls short at capturing non-
minimum employees behavior: in fact, almost 66 percent of the observed behavior is in the opposite 
direction. Interestingly, minimum and non-minimum employees do not differ substantially in their 
likelihood to reduce or increase errors. 
                                                
19 Since changes from the two extremes of zero and four errors can only occur in one direction, the results for these 
extreme cases are reported separately.   20
Learning Direction Theory only states the direction of change, and not the reasons for, or the 
magnitude of such change. However, average errors made and extra time bought by both types of 
employees (minimum and non-minimum) can partly overcome this shortcoming and shed light on 
the differences occurring between successful and unsuccessful firms. Specifically, in Table 9 we 
report the average number of errors and the average extra time bought in round r separately for 
minimum and non-minimum employees in round r-1.  
        [Table 9 about here] 
Both  minimum  and  non-minimum  employees  in  unsuccessful  firms  perform  worse  than  their 
counterparts in successful firms. Furthermore, non-minimum employees in successful firms buy 
extra time more than twice as often as compared to those in unsuccessful firms. The implications 
are twofold: on the one hand, in unsuccessful firms, strategic considerations induced non-minimum 
employees not to ask for extra time and possibly not to perform the task at their best; on the other, 
in successful firms, non-minimum employees were highly motivated not to give up, given that they 
bought a higher, although not statistically significant, amount of extra time. 
Learning  Direction Theory fares poorly  at  explaining  how and why coordination failure  is 
overcome, while the presence of “leaders” that tend to hold steady better explains the observed 
behavior in successful firms. 
Result IIb: Best performers in successful firms, apparently in an attempt to overcome a history of 
coordination failure, tend to hold steady by committing few errors and buying a fairly high amount 
of  extra  time.  In  contrast,  unsuccessful  firms  are  characterized  by  a  number  of  employees 
performing very poorly and, as a consequence, by non-minimum employees giving up after some 
periods.  
 
5.3. Dynamic Analysis: Group vs. Individual Conditions  
Does strategic uncertainty undermine the learning process in the counting task? We now turn 
to the comparison between Group and Individual conditions to answer our third set of research   21
questions on the interaction between strategic and task learning. Indeed, since strategic learning is 
not present in Individual conditions, task learning alone is responsible for variations in the number 
of errors,  Individual treatments  indicate to  what extent strategic  uncertainty affects employees’ 
performance in Group treatments. In particular, we expect the decline in the number of errors to be 
slower in Group as compared to Individual if negative expectations develop within a firm.  Figure 4 
shows average extra time and errors over time for both Individual and Group conditions, pooled by 
treatments. An overall downward tendency is evident in both the Group and Individual conditions 
and  suggests  that  task  learning  was  similar  across  conditions.  In  particular,  errors  are  not 
significantly different between Individual and Group conditions; the parallel decline in the number 
of errors and behavior over time is interesting given the extremely unforgiving nature of the weak-
link game. Moreover, extra time is lower in Group as compared to Individual conditions, hence 
suggesting that employees in the Group conditions may have worked even harder than those in the 
Individual conditions, since they performed the same task (with the same level of precision) in a 
shorter time.  
          [Figure 4 about here] 
Furthermore, successful firms performed better than employees playing alone, although the 
difference is not significant at any conventional level (p=0.889, two-sided Mann-Whitney ranked-
sum test), while the opposite was true, and statistically in a significant manner (p=0.006, two-
sided), for unsuccessful firms. In particular, the number of errors over time declined more slowly in 
unsuccessful  firms  as  compared  to  Individual  conditions.  Consequently,  repeated  failure  to 
coordinate on higher-payoff outcomes may have lead employees to exert lower levels of effort 
relative to Individual conditions and thus may have interfered with task learning.  
Result III: Individual and Group conditions follow similar patterns of learning and both initial and 
overall  performance  are  largely  indistinguishable  between  the  two  conditions;  that  is,  at  the 
aggregate level, the process of task learning is not undermined or “slowed down” by strategic 
uncertainty.    22
    
In the previous section we presented results from the Learning Direction Theory for Group data; 
the right column of Table 8 presents a similar analysis for the Individual conditions. Since no 
distinction between minimum and non-minimum employees is possible (i.e., each firm is composed 
of only one employee), changes in behavior are classified only according to the number of errors 
(Errors=0,  Errors=4, and  0<Errors<4).
20  A comparison  between  Individual and  Group  behavior  
reveals that the direction of change was almost the same in the two conditions, although it is worth 
noticing a difference regarding the behavior of the worst performers, i.e., of employees making 4 
errors in a given round. In the Individual conditions, only 52 percent of the employees who made 4 
errors in a round made fewer errors in the following round, while more than 80 percent of the 
employees  in  the  Group  conditions  did  so.  It  appears  that  a  form  of  peer  pressure  (or  maybe 
competition) induced very poor performers (i.e., employees committing four errors or more) to try 
to improve their performance in the following round more often than the corresponding employees 
who  were playing  alone. While behavior in successful firms and  Individual treatments follows 
similar adaptation dynamics, employees in unsuccessful firms are less likely to adjust their behavior 
in the direction of efficiency than employees playing alone.
21  
 
5.4. Effectiveness of the Bonus 
Does an increased bonus enhance coordination? In the period immediately before the bonus 
increase, few firms were still trapped in coordination failure; as a consequence, the increase in the 
bonus rate did not translate into an abrupt fall in the number of errors
22. As expected, only a few 
                                                
20 Observations from the latter range of errors have to be compared with both minimum and non-minimum players. 
21 The differences between Individual and successful firms are not significant at any conventional level. The differences 
in the percentages of employees that decreased their errors between Individual and unsuccessful firms are statistically 
significant at the 5% level according to a Mann-Whitney ranked-sum test. Only the difference for non-minimum 
employees that did 0 errors at time t is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
22 Both the worst performance and the number of errors slightly increased. However, the worsening in firm performance 
was due to a small number of subjects (14 out of 96) and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test failed to reject the null hypothesis 
(p=0.5984, two-tailed) that the number of errors were equal in round 8 and 9. Even though our result seems to 
contradict previous findings, two factors not present in other experiments render the comparison difficult. First, subjects 
were not trapped in the worst possible outcome. Actually, 55 out of 96 subjects made zero errors immediately before   23
firms showed an increase in the number of errors at the firm level (5 out of 24) or at the employee 
level (1 out of 24). Moreover, in 11 out of 24 firms, errors (both at employee and firm level) 
increased or remained constant after the bonus was decreased; in all the other groups the worst 
performance  and  the  errors  declined  even  when  the  bonus  was  decreased.  Extra  time  slightly 
increased from the last four rounds of Part 1 to Part 2 (from 0.20 to 0.22), after the high bonus was 
introduced,
23 and decreased to 0.14 in the last Part of the experiment. 
In order to disentangle the relative contribution of bonus and experience, we use the Individual 
conditions in which the bonus was kept fixed (I50Fixed and I20Fixed) as a benchmark. Figure 7 
shows no effect of the increase in the bonus rate on errors.  
However, unsuccessful firms show a tendency to decrease their errors in Part 2, even though 
there is some variability in the trend.  
        [Figure 5 about here] 
Result IV: in 11 out of 24 firms the bonus had the expected effect (i.e., errors declined in Part 2 and 
slightly increased in Part 3), while in 12 of the remaining firms the number of errors declined even 
when the bonus rate was decreased. Given the individual behavior in the fixed-bonus condition, the 
evidence suggests that the bonus increase did not significantly enhance coordination.  
 
5.5. Effectiveness of Informational Feedback and Importance of Deviation Costs 
Do modes of information feedback and size of deviation costs affect errors and coordination? 
Different information feedback did not result in statistically significant differences in errors and 
worst  performance  in  the  high-deviation  cost  treatments  (F50  and  P50),  whereas,  per  Mann-
Whitney  ranked-sum  test,  the  low-deviation  cost  treatments  (F20  and  P20)  are  significantly 
                                                                                                                                                            
and after the bonus was introduced. Second, in our setting, a sharp decline in the number of errors was subject to 
individual abilities constraints. 
23 The increase in the number of extra-time in Part 2 was for the major part due to the Partial20 treatment: the average 
extra-time bought in round 9-12 was 0.44 while in the four rounds before it was 0.28; interestingly, the number of errors 
and the worst performance in round 9-12 was the same of the one in round 5-8.   24
different in terms of both errors (p= 0.036, two-tailed) and worst performance (p= 0.076, two-
tailed), suggesting that partial feedback is efficiency-enhancing for low-deviation costs.  
As predicted, different deviation costs have an impact on the number of slots of extra time 
acquired; a pairwise comparison reveals that the amount of extra time bought differs significantly 
between the low- and high-deviation cost treatments (p=0.0684, Mann-Whitney two-tailed ranked- 
sum test). However, the higher amount of extra time bought in the low-deviation cost treatments did 
not translate into any statistically significant difference in either the average number of errors or the 
average worst performance according to a Mann-Whitney two-tailed ranked sum test.  
Result V: Partial feedback was efficiency-enhancing (in term of errors and worst performance) only 
in treatments with low deviation costs. Low deviation costs resulted in a higher amount of extra 
time bought. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
We have explored whether (1) initial failure to coordinate and (2) subsequent unraveling in 
weak-link experiments  survives  the  use  of  real effort. While  we  observe frequent coordination 
failure in the initial round(s), the answer to (2) seems to be largely negative: our results are, indeed, 
in stark contrast to previous chosen-effort experiments in that the majority of our laboratory firms 
were able to reduce their errors and worst performance over time, thus achieving high levels of 
coordination.  Also  in  contrast  to  previous  lab  evidence  on  the  weak-link  game,  many  firms 
overcame initial inefficiency without payoff changes that are known to be efficiency-enhancing.
24  
We have investigated how task and strategic learning interact, and we have found that both task 
learning  (which  pertains  to  practice)  and  strategic  interaction  (which  pertains  to  employees’ 
expectations) are the two forces that seem to increase performance over time. The comparison 
between our Group and Individual treatments leads us to conclude that successful coordination was 
                                                
24 In previous experiments, a similar pattern has only been observed in Engelmann and Normann (2007).   25
not determined solely by task learning, but also by the effort exerted, which did not seem to decline 
over time in contrast to what has been observed in previous chosen- effort experiments.  
We have analyzed how and why successful coordination was achieved; coordination failure was 
overcome mainly because of employees who, in an apparent attempt to help their firm overcome 
coordination failure, held steady even when it was costly to them because other members of their 
firm  exhibited  a  poorer  performance.  This  behavior  is  inconsistent  with  adaptation  but  recalls 
“signaling” and “strategic teaching” dynamics (e.g., Camerer et al., 2002; 2003), which had been 
observed in previous chosen effort weak-link experiments where the combination of strong leaders 
and responsive followers helped overcome initial coordination failure in some cases (e.g., Brandts 
and  Cooper,  2006b;  Brandts  et.  al.,  2007).  However,  in  the  previous  experiments  “strategic 
teaching”  was  only  observed  under  specific  conditions  (i.e.,  increased  bonuses)  and  with  full 
information feedback, which allowed players to directly signal better strategies to others through 
their choices of actions. In our case, this behavior is much more pervasive, suggesting that other 
forces might be at work. It may be that subjects tried to perform at their best instead of choosing 
effort strategically out of some sense of competitiveness that may exist in groups engaged in  real- 
effort tasks (but not in subjects playing alone). A related explanation would be the existence of a 
social norm – again, triggered by the real-effort context – of “working” (rather than “shirking”) 
when  the  whole  group’s  outcome  depends  on  each  member  (Akerlof 1982).  Both  factors  may 
account for the fact that extremely poor performers in the Group conditions (i.e., subjects making 
four  or  more  errors)  improved  their  performance  in the  next  round  with  a  significantly  higher 
frequency  than  in  the  Individual  condition,  and  this  finding  holds  for  both  successful  and 
unsuccessful firms. A further explanation is that the behavior of other players in a real-effort task is 
more predictable than in a chosen-effort task: as a consequence, the strategic uncertainty that Van 
Huyck et al. (1990) identified as the major reason for the speedy unraveling toward the worst 
equilibrium was reduced in our experiment. We are not able to disentangle the relative contributions 
of these three explanations through our experiment,.   26
Our results do confirm that expectations and strategic considerations play also a role in real-
effort experiments. Indeed, the behavior of participants in unsuccessful groups shows that negative 
expectations  caused  by  repeated  failure  to  coordinate  affected  task  learning,  slowing  it  down 
relative to the Individual condition and hence presumably causing a decrease in the level of effort 
exerted, although we note that even in unsuccessful groups most employees kept exerting a positive 
effort  level  throughout  the  experiment.  Hence,  we  conclude  that,  despite  the  extreme  task 
interdependence  and  highly  unforgiving  payoff  structure  of  the  weak-link  game,  “virtuous” 
dynamics emerging at the group level can produce an average performance that is not lower (and in 
some cases even higher) than the average performance that the group members could produce if 
they  were paid individually. To  what extent these virtuous  dynamics are triggered  by strategic 
teaching,  competition,  social  norms,  or  other  motivations  will  be  investigated  in  further 
experiments.  
Finally, we have explored the effect of increased bonuses, deviation costs, and informational 
feedback. Successful coordination is reached by the majority of firms well before any change in the 
payoffs  structure  (i.e.,  increased  bonuses),  rendering  the  variation  in  the  bonus  rate  of  lesser 
importance than in other contexts (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2006b). Notably, a temporary increase 
in the bonuses has no overall effect, whilst it has a positive effect when only unsuccessful firms are 
considered. That is, an increased incentive may have a positive, even though transient, effect on 
poorly performing groups. The effect of deviation costs goes in the predicted direction, in that less 
extra time is asked when deviation costs are higher; errors and worst performance, however, are not 
positively affected by higher levels of extra time. This behavior suggests, on the one hand, that 
employees understood well that the action of buying extra time is risky and especially so when 
deviation costs are high and, on the other hand, that the challenging nature of the task served as an 
incentive  to  work  harder.  Contrary  to  what  Berninghaus  and  Ehrhart  (2001)  and  Brandts  and 
Cooper (2206a) have found, partial feedback was efficiency-enhancing, but only in treatments with 
low deviation costs.    27
Our results are in line with some empirical evidence on actual organizations in which group- 
oriented  payment  schemes  work  as  good  as,  and  in  some  cases  outperform,  individual-based 
payment (Pfeffer, 1998). Further experiments employing real effort might help shed some light on 
the reasons why this happens.  
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Instructions for Full Information and High Deviation Costs 
Group condition: (italic in brackets) 
Individual condition: [highlighted in yellow and in squared brackets] 
 
General information: The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions. [The 
experiment is strictly individual] For having shown up on time you have earned 2 Euros. From now 
on, and until the end of the experiment, any communication with other participants is not allowed. 
If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to your desk 
to answer it.  
You will be able to earn money in the experiment. All the money you earn during the experiment is 
expressed in Experimental Currency Units, or ECUs, that will be converted in Euros at an exchange 
rate of one Euro for 333 ECUs. Upon completion of the experiment the amount that you earned will 
be paid to you in cash. Payments are confidential; no other participant will be told the amount you 
earned. 
 
Parts, rounds (and groups): This experiment will have 3 parts. In Part 1 there will be 8 rounds. After 
these 8 rounds have finished, we will give you instructions for Part 2 of the experiment. (Before the 
experiment proper starts, the software will randomly match you with three other participants in this 
room. The composition of the groups, made of 4 participants each, will be the same in all rounds.) 
 
The following instructions are about Part 1 only. 
 
Description of the task in Part 1 of the Experiment: You (and the other members of your group) are 
[an] employee(s) of a firm, and you can think of a round of the experiment as being a workweek.  
 
In each round: 
-  (each of the employees is) [you are] assigned a task to be completed. (The task, that will be 
described later on, is the same for all four employees of the firm.) Specifically, you will 
receive  a  small  bag  containing  4  different  types  of  coins  worth  1,  2,  5,  and  10  cents, 
respectively; your  task consists of  correctly  counting how many coins  of each type are 
contained in the bag you were given;  
-  you will be endowed with a fixed amount of regular time (45 seconds) to complete the task. 
This regular time will pay you a fixed wage of 200 ECUs regardless of your performance;  
-  you may choose to buy extra time to complete the task if necessary. Extra time gives you 
more time to complete the task but entails a cost that you will be charged for. Since you can 
earn additional money depending on [your performance] (the performance of your group 
(including yourself)), it might be profitable for you to pay for having extra time. When 
exactly that will be the case is explained next. 
 
Performance measurement: (For each employee, the number of mistakes is the sum of mistakes that 
he or she has made in counting each type of coins. The firm’s performance and your earnings 
depend however, upon the highest number of mistakes a member of your group (including you) has 
made. From here on we refer to this as the worst performance in the group.) [Your performance 
and your earnings depend upon the number of your counting mistakes, that is, the sum of mistakes 
that you have made in counting each type of coins.].  
                                                
25 This is a translation of the original instructions which were in Italian.    32
Payoffs:  The  payoff  you  will  receive  in  a  round  depends  on  your  performance  (and  on  the 
performance of the other members of your group (and in particular the worst performance in the 
group)) according to the following payoff table (all values are expressed in ECUs):  
 
   
[My performance (number of errors)] 
(Highest number of mistakes in my firm (number of 
errors)) 






0  440  380  320  260  200 
1  390  330  270  210  150 
2  340  280  220  160  100 
3  290  230  170  110  50 
4  240  180  120  60  0 
 
In each round, you are guaranteed a fixed wage of 200 ECUs (unless you buy slots of extra time 
about  which  more  below).  You  will  also  be  paid  a  bonus  that  depends  on  [your]  (the  worst) 
performance (in the group). The maximum bonus for Part 1 of the experiment is 240 ECUs. Thus, if 
(none of the employees of the firm including) you [do not] make any mistakes you can earn a 
maximum of 440 ECUs . 
 
Focus initially on the first row of the payoff table (i.e., Slot of Extra Time I have bought = 0): in 
that row the (highest) number of [your] mistakes (in your firm) is reported in the columns of the 
payoff table: if the (highest) number of mistakes is greater or equal to 4, the bonus will be zero. 
Please, note that you are guaranteed a fixed pay of 200 ECU in each round (unless you buy slots of 
extra time about which more below), no matter how bad your performance is, or even if you do 
nothing. (For example, if you and two other employees of the firm have made 0 mistakes and the 
fourth employee of your firm has made 4 (either because s/he has actually committed four or more 
counting mistakes, or because s/he has chosen not to perform the task), the highest number of 
mistakes in your firm is 4 (the last column of the matrix).) 
 
Your payoff also depends on the extra time that you buy. You can buy up to 4 slots of extra time of 
12 seconds in each round; each slot of extra time will cost you 50 ECUs. You will incur a cost if 
and only if you ask for extra time ((extra time asked for  by the other employees of your firm will be 
paid by them)). Rows 2 – 5 break out the payoffs for the various contingencies. Note that your 
payoff depends on how many slots of extra time you buy but also, IMPORTANTLY, on (the worst) 
[your] performance (in the group (the highest number of mistakes may be yours or that of another 
member of the group.).)  
 
For example, if you buy 2 slots of extra time, the third row gives you the relevant payoffs. For 
instance, [if your number of mistakes] (if the highest number of mistakes in your group) is 4 ((which 
is not necessarily the number of your errors)) and you have bought 2 slots of extra time, your 
earnings will be shown in the third row and the last column, yielding a payoff of 100 ECUs. 
 
On your desk you can find a paper copy of the payoff table in order to have the possibility to easily 
check it whenever you want. Please, make sure you understand how to read the payoff matrix since 
your earnings are based on it. If you have doubts that you understand how to read the payoff table 
please raise your hand now.    33
Practical implementation:  
Before each round starts you have to wear the headphones you have on your desk.  
Before each round starts, you will receive a small bag containing coins of four different types: 1, 2, 
5, and 10 cents. In general, the total number of coins contained in the bag varies from round to 
round while the types of coins (1, 2, 5, and 10 cents) will be the same throughout the experiment 
Your counting mistakes are given by the sum of the difference between the correct number of coins 
of each type and the number that you report. 
 
For each round of the experiment, a screen like the one shown below will be displayed on your 




You are allowed to open the bag with the coins only after the round has started. Once you have 
opened your bag you can pour the coins in the tray on your desk (make sure to remove all objects 
from the bag).  
 
Recall that the task consists of counting how many coins of each type are contained in the bag you 
were given for that round. 
 
Please, pay attention to the screenshot: 
the four cells in the bottom part of the screen have to be filled with the number of coins you have 
counted. Each cell corresponds to one of the types of coins you have in your bag. You may change 
the entered numbers as many times as you like, but once you click on ‘OK’ your choice for that 
round is final. WHEN THE TIME  (REGULAR AND  EXTRA TIME  YOU MIGHT BUY) IS 
OVER, THE SCREEN WILL DISAPPEAR AND YOU WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO ENTER 
THE NUMBERS. In the case that you have not filled the cells with numbers, or you have NOT 
CLICKED  ON  ‘OK’,  all  cells  will  be  automatically  filled  with  zero.  This  will  translate 
automatically into (the firm) [you] having 4 or more mistakes. (Please recall that your earnings do 
not depend on your performance only, but they depend on the worst performance in the group.) 
 
During the round you can, at any time, buy extra time by clicking on ‘Acquista Extra Time’ and the 
time will be automatically added to the timer. Each time you ask for extra time you will incur a 
cost. In each round you can buy up to four slots of extra time. IF YOU WANT TO BUY EXTRA 
TIME MAKE SURE TO BUY IT BEFORE THE TIME HAS EXPIRED because once the time is 
over the program will NOT ALLOW you to buy extra time. A sound will alert you that the time is   34
about  to  expire.  Once  the  time  is  expired  the  round  is  finished  and  you  can  NEITHER  BUY 
EXTRA TIME NOR INSERT THE NUMBER OF OBJECTS YOU HAVE COUNTED.  
 
Once the round is finished please fill up the small bag with all the objects you have counted. After 
the end of each round the experimenter will collect your bag and will give you a new one for the 
next round. 
 
Information that you will receive: After each round the computer will display a screen like the one 
shown below. The actual number of mistakes you have made, and, in brackets, the extra time you 
asked for are reported in the second column (Num Errori (sec extratime)). In the third column the 
(highest) number of mistakes (made by all of the employees in your firm (you included)) [and extra 
time] is displayed, [but], if the (highest) number of mistakes is greater than four, the screen will 
display 4 and not the actual number of errors, (and the extra time asked by each of the members of 
your group will be displayed in brackets. Please  recall that your bonus depends  on the worst 
performance in your group (= highest number of mistakes in your firm, as reported in the second 





At the end of the 8 rounds, information about that round will be displayed and a message on the 
screen will alert you that the first part is over. 
 
Payment: At the end of the experiment you will be paid, in cash, the sum of the payoffs that you 
will have earned during the experiment plus the show up fee of 2 Euros. The conversion rate is one 
Euro for 333 ECUs. 
 
To make sure that you have correctly understood how your earnings are computed, please answer to 
the  questions  in  the  anonymous  quiz  you  have  on  your  desk.  Once  you  have  completed  the 
questionnaire,  please  raise  your  hand  and  the  experimenter  will  collect  it.  If  mistakes  will  be 
detected in the correction of the questionnaire, the experimenter will repeat aloud the instructions 
and he will answer whatever questions you might have. During the experiment, if any type of 
communication is detected by the experimenter the session will be immediately concluded and 
nobody will be paid.  
If you have questions, please raise your hand.   35
Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire for High Deviation Costs and Full Feedback 
Individual condition: [in squared brackets] 
Group condition: (italic in brackets) and highlighted in grey, when different 
 
Before beginning the experiment, please answer the following questions. This short anonymous 
questionnaire is to make sure that everybody has correctly understood the instructions and it does 
not affect your earnings. If you are having trouble answering the questions, please raise your hand 
and one of the experimenter will come to your desk. After having answered all questions, please 
raise your hand and one of us will collect the questionnaire.  
 
For all of these questions, make reference to the following payoff matrix: 
   
[My performance (number of errors)] 
(Highest number of mistakes in my firm (number of 
errors)) 






0  440  380  320  260  200 
1  390  330  270  210  150 
2  340  280  220  160  100 
3  290  230  170  110  50 
4  240  180  120  60  0 
 
The first question is an example and will be illustrated by the experimenter: 
 
1.  Suppose you have made 2 errors and have bought 1 slot of extra time: 
 
Your payoff is           ________ 
 
 
Suppose a firm is composed of employees A, B, C, and D. The following table summarizes their 
choices in one round: 
Player  Number of 
mistakes 
Slots of extra 
time bought 
A  0  4 
B  2  0 
C  2  3 
D  3  0 
 
The highest number of errors is        ________ 
 
Player A payoff is             ________ 
Player B payoff is             ________ 
Player C payoff is             ________ 
Player D payoff is             ________ 
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Please, answer individually to the following questions: 
 
2.  Suppose that your bag contains 10 coins of 1 cent, 12 coins of 2 cents, 13 coins of 5 cents and 5 
coins of 10 cents. The result of your counting is the following 
 
The number of your mistakes is         ________ 
 
3.  Please complete the following table with the missing values 
 
Number of errors  Number of Extra Time  Payoff 
0  4   
4  1   
2    270 
1    280 
1  3   
0  0   
 
Suppose a firm is composed of employees A, B, C, and D. The following table summarizes their 
choices in one round: 
 
Player  Number of 
mistakes 
Slots of extra 
time 
A  0  4 
B  0  0 
C  1  3 
D  4  1 
 
Player A payoff is             ________ 
Player B payoff is             ________ 
Player C payoff is             ________ 
Player D payoff is             ________ 
 
Suppose you make 0 errors and buy 2 slots of extra time. All the other employees of your firm 
make 2 errors and buy 0 slots of extra time. 
 
Your payoff is             ________   37
The other employees’ payoff is         ________ 
 
Suppose you make 2 errors and buy 3 slots of extra time. The other employees of your firm make 
0, 1, and 4 errors and buy, respectively, 3, 0, and 1 slots of extra time. 
 








Your number of errors in round 2 is            _________ 
The number of slots of extra time you bought in round 2 is     _________ 
Your payoff in round 2 is               _________ 
Your cumulated payoff is              _________ 
 




Your number of mistakes is            _________ 
The highest number of mistakes in your firm is      _________ 
The number of slots of extra time you asked for is      _________ 
The highest number of slots of extra time asked in your group is  _________ 
 
 
5.  On your desk you have a bag similar to the ones you will receive during the experiment. Please 
count how many coins of each type are contained in the bag and fill the blank cell in the 
following screenshot according to the result of your counting. 
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Table 1: Brands and Cooper (2006) Payoff Table, B=6 and C=5 
 
    Minimum Effort by Employees 
    40  30  20  10  0 
Effort by 
Employee i 
40  240  180  120  60  0 
30    230  170  110  50 
20      220  160  100 
10        210  150 




Table 2: Payoff Tables 
 
Employee payoff, B=60 and C=50  Employee payoff, B=100 and C=50 
   
Worst performance in the group  
(number of errors) 
     0  1  2  3  4 or > 
Slots of  
Extra 
 Time I  
have  
bought 
0  440  380  320  260  200 
1  390  330  270  210  150 
2  340  280  220  160  100 
3  290  230  170  110  50 
4  240  180  120  60  0 
 
   
Worst performance in the group  
(number of errors) 
    0  1  2  3  4 or > 
Slots of  
Extra 
 Time I  
have  
bought 
0  600  500  400  300  200 
1  550  450  350  250  150 
2  500  400  300  200  100 
3  450  350  250  150  50 
4  400  300  200  100  0 
 
 
Employee payoff, B=60 and C=20 
   
Worst performance in the group  
(number of errors) 
     0  1  2  3  4 or > 
Slots of  
Extra 
 Time I  
have  
bought 
0  440  380  320  260  200 
1  420  360  300  240  180 
2  400  340  280  220  160 
3  380  320  260  200  140 
4  360  300  240  180  120 
 
 
Employee payoff, B=100 and C=20 
   
Worst performance in the group  
(number of errors) 
     0  1  2  3  4 or > 
Slots of  
Extra 
 Time I  
have  
bought 
0  600  500  400  300  200 
1  580  480  380  280  180 
2  560  460  360  260  160 
3  540  440  340  240  140 
4  520  420  320  220  120 
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Table 3: Summary of the three parts of the  
experiment for the two bonus rate schemes 
 
  Bonus Rate 
  Variable  Fixed 
Part 1 (1-8)  60  60 
Part 2 (9-12)  100  60 
Part 3 (13-16)  60  60 
 
Table 4: List of Treatments 
 






































Bonus  Variable  Variable  Variable  Variable  Variable  Variable  Fixed  Fixed 
# of subjects  24  24  24  24  12  12  12  12 
Note: Treatments have been varied along the four dimensions reported in the first column; observations for 
each cell are reported in the bottom line.   40
 
Table 5a: Distribution of Errors and Extra Time in Round 1, by Group and Individual Conditions 
 
  Round 1: Distribution of Errors ( ) 1 e  




Group  39.58  12.50  8.33  2.08  37.50  100 
(Individual)  (43.75)  (8.33)  (8.33)  (2.08)  (37.50)  (100) 
Extra Time 
Slots 
Group  0.42  0.42  0.63  1.00  0.42  0.45 
(Individual)  (0.95)  (1.25)  (0.75)  (1.00)  (0.17)  (0.67) 
 
Table 5b: Distribution of Errors and Extra Time Round 1 through 4, by Group and Individual Conditions 
 
  Round 1 through 4: Distribution of Average Errors ( ) 4 1− e  
  
 



















Group  57.29  26.04  9.38  7.29  100 
(Individual)  (66.67)  (16.67)  (10.42)  (6.25)  (100) 
Extra Time 
Slots 
Group  0.23  0.48  0.25  0.43  0.31 
(Individual)  (0.70)  (0.28)  (0.45)  (0.75)  (0.61)   41
 
Table 6: Errors, Extra Time and Worst Performance by Treatment, all Session Pooled 
Errors  Full50  Partial50  Full20  Partial20  Ind50Var  Ind20Var  Ind50Fixed  Ind20Fixed 
Round  1-4  1.0  1.7  1.4  0.7  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.0 
  5-8  0.6  0.9  0.8  0.4  0.6  0.9  0.8  0.9 
  9-12  0.5  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.6  0.6 
  13-16  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.3  0.7  0.8 
                   
Extra 
Time 
Full50  Partial50  Full20  Partial20  Ind50Var  Ind20Var  Ind50Fixed  Ind20Fixed 
Round  1-4  0.16  0.24  0.29  0.55  0.46  0.56  0.71  0.71 
  5-8  0.16  0.11  0.23  0.28  0.04  0.38  0.44  0.42 
  9-12  0.17  0.06  0.22  0.44  0.04  0.40  0.25  0.38 
  13-16  0.13  0.06  0.14  0.25  0.04  0.19  0.33  0.46 
                 
Worst 
Performance 
Full50  Partial50  Full20  Partial20         
Round  1-4  2.5  3.2  3.3  1.8         
  5-8  1.7  2.1  2.3  1.3         
  9-12  1.4  1.8  1.8  1.3         
  13-16  0.9  1.3  2.1  1.3         
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Table 7: Worst Performance, Errors, Extra Time, and Gap (WP-BP) in Rounds 1 through 4, by Successful 
and Unsuccessful Firms 






Worst Performance  2.42  3.80  p=0.003 
Errors  1.01  2.04  p=0.004 
Extra Time  1.14  1.60  p=0.107 
Gap (WP-BP)  2.28  3.15  p=0.085 
 
Note:  all  values  are  computed  as  the  average  over  rounds  1  through  4.  The 
variable  Gap  (WP-BP)  is  computed  as  the  difference  between  the  worst 












% decreased errors 







No  Yes 
   
Errors = 4 (Obs)  (150)  (68)  (82)    (88) 
  % unchanged errors  24.00%  38.24%  12.20%  26.04% 
(p=0.243) 
47.73% 
  % decreased errors  76.00%  61.76%  87.80%  52.27% 
           
Errors <4 & >0 (Obs)  (184)  (31)  (153)    (136) 
  % increased errors  17.39%  35.48%  13.73%  26.13% 
(p=0.020) 
17.42% 
  % unchanged errors  12.50%  16.13%  11.76%  11.36% 
  % decreased errors  70.11%  48.38%  74.51%  71.21% 
NON-MINIMUM  
EMPLOYEES           
Errors <4 & >0 (Obs)  (139)  (61)  (78)    (136) 
 % increased errors  16.54%  27.87%  7.44%  22.82% 
(p=0.095) 
17.42% 
  % unchanged errors  17.99%  18.03%  17.95%  11.36% 
  % decreased errors  65.47%  54.10%  76.92%  71.21% 
           
Errors = 0 (Obs)  (591)  (140)  (451)    (500) 
  % increased errors  24.70%  31.43%  22.61%  8.81% 
(p=0.303) 
20.00% 
  % unchanged errors  75.30%  68.57%  77.38%  80.00% 
Note: frequencies of changes in the number of errors from round t to round t+1 by errors and type 
of employee (minimum vs. non-minimum). Last column reports frequencies of changes in the 
number of errors from round t to round r+1 in the Individual treatments, all session pooled.  
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Table 9: Learning Direction Theory, Average Errors and  
Extra Time by Type of Player 
 




  No  Yes  (Mann-Whitney) 
Minimum Players 
in round r-1 
     
Average Error 
in round r 
1.86  0.75  p=0.001 
Average extra time 
In round r  
0.26  0.20  p=0.441 
Non-Minimum Players 
In round r-1 
     
Average Error 
in round r 
0.89  0.43  p=0.046 
Average Extra Time 
in round r  
0.05  0.12  p=0.403 
  
Average  errors  and  extra  time  in  round  r  by  type  of  employees 
(minimum/non-minimum) at time r-1 
   44
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